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Introduction
A cursory look at countries, regions, and cities reveal large disparities in productivity. Moreover, highly productive areas often tend to be associated with clustering of knowledge intensive industries.
This has led many economists to believe that localized knowledge spillovers are at play. Consequently, knowledge spillovers have become a central feature in the endogenous growth literature, modern international trade, and in recent developments of economic geography.
Scientific advances and innovations can be copied, so spillover effects seem endemic to the accumulation of knowledge. What is less clear is the scope of the externality. Social ties and network effects have been suggested as possible explanations for weakening diffusion with geographic distance. However, explicit modelling of such considerations is in its infancy. 1 Direct measurements of such effects are difficult given the basic premise that local spillovers are generated by tacit knowledge. 2 This paper develops a stylized model of trade, where the source of the localized spillover is workers' private information about their skills. The technological frontier is common knowledge, but effects similar to localized knowledge spillovers nevertheless occur in equilibrium due to an informational externality that arises when rational firms estimate the worker skills using Bayes rule. As a result, comparative advantages can arise purely as an equilibrium phenomenon.
The model is a minimal deviation from neoclassical theory. Two countries have access to the same technology. A "high-tech" good requires skilled labor to produce, whereas a "low-tech" good can be produced by both skilled and unskilled labor. There are no trade frictions or technological externalities and workers decide on whether to acquire the skill necessary in the high tech sector based on costs and benefits from doing so. Countries are endowed with identical distributions of workers, so there is no exogenous source that creates comparative advantages.
Our only assumption that departs from traditional neoclassical theory is that skills cannot be 1 Eeckhout and Jovanovic [5] , construct a model of imperfect knowledge spillovers with solid micro foundations.
However, there is no spatial dimension in this model. 2 Some indirect approaches to measuring the geographic localization of knowledge have been proposed. Notably, Jaffe et al [11] argue that patent citations can be taken as a proxy for knowledge spillovers. Hence, if patent violators tend to be clustered near the patent holder, this is taken as evidence for localized knowledge.
perfectly observed. Rational firms therefore use prior knowledge about the distribution of skills when evaluating workers. In equilibrium, the prior is given by the aggregate skill level in the population. Given a noisy measurement of the skills of an individual worker, the firms' assessment of the likelihood that the worker is skilled is monotonically increasing in the aggregate skill level.
Aggregate skills therefore act like a public good, and create a derived informational externality.
If the high tech sector is more intensive in skilled labor, the informational externality creates a force in favor of specialization. As a result, equilibria emerge where one country has more skilled workers and a higher standard of living than the other. In equilibrium, a comparative advantage for the rich country in the high tech sector arises endogenously.
The two crucial assumptions are i) the asymmetric effect of human capital on productivity in the two sectors, and, ii) the imperfect observability of skills, which generates the informational externality. To isolate the interplay between these assumptions, the rest of the model deviates as little as possible from textbook trade theory.
In equilibrium, workers are paid the expected value of their contributions to output. High signal workers are more likely to perform well in a high tech firm, implying that the equilibrium wage is increasing in the signal. Wages for both high and low signal workers also depend on aggregate investments, and incentives to acquire skills are supported by differences in expected wages for high and low skilled workers. The informational externality therefore creates a feedback between aggregate skills and incentives for skill acquisition.
Trade and inequalities are driven by the interaction between the informational externality and price effects. The price effects are straightforward. An increase in the skill level abroad shifts production of the high tech good towards the foreign country. Since skills are more abundant after the change, the wage differential between workers with high and low signals decreases, thereby reducing incentives at home. The same reduction in the relative price of skilled labor operates also in the foreign country. But, unlike the country where the skill level is held fix, the increase in the skill level also affects the inference made by the firms, and thereby wages, directly. Incentives are therefore affected asymmetrically in the two countries when investments change in one country.
The price effects are present also with perfect information, but factor price equalization would then imply that wages depend only on the investment decision. Nationality is then irrelevant, so, if the informational asymmetry is removed, the model has a unique equilibrium with no gainful trade.
Asymmetric information is thus crucial for the price effects to work "as if" there is a negative cross country externality in human capital investments.
Under some restrictions on parameters, there is a unique autarky equilibrium, but equilibria where countries specialize nevertheless arise under free trade. There is also a symmetric equilibrium replicating autarky, with no gainful trade and no inequality, but this equilibrium may be unstable under free trade. Our model thus opens up the possibility that cross country income differences is an inevitable aspect of free trade. This outcome may however be Pareto superior to the symmetric equilibrium, so although the model is compatible with uneven development, it does not follow that the model is a justification for trade barriers to protect infant industries.
There is no systematic advantage for large economies in our model. Almost all analysis considers a world consisting of two countries, but equilibria of the two-country model can be reinterpreted as an equilibrium of a n country extension, where countries are partitioned into a "North" and a "South". In this reinterpretation, the size of an individual nation is irrelevant. Only the relative size of the South to the North matters. The model is thus consistent with a world where there is no particular relationship between size and development.
Being static and highly stylized, our model has some obvious drawbacks compared with models considered in (for example) the endogenous growth literature. However, we believe that the explicit micro foundation of the externality considered in this paper is an important virtue. As has been pointed out by many others (for example Lucas [14] ), it is a serious drawback that it is unclear whether cities, regions, industries, countries, language groups, trading blocks, or something else is the most relevant unit for the scope of localized knowledge spillovers. 3 In contrast, the derived informational externality of the model studied in this paper is necessarily local, being limited in scope by barriers to labor mobility.
3 It should be stressed that there are circumstances where this arbitrariness with local spillovers is less problematic.
In particular, in the emerging literature on the role of cities there are many well established empirical regularities that provide meaningful restrictions on the way local externalities enter (see for example Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg [15] or Eeckhout [4] ). 
Preferences and Human Capital Investments
Agents have preferences over two consumption goods, x 1 and x 2 , and a binary investment choice.
All agents have identical preferences over the two goods, but differ in their attitudes towards the investment decision. This is modelled by assuming that the workers of each country are distributed on interval [c, c] according to a distribution function G, where c ∈ [c, c] is interpreted as the utility cost (or gain if negative) of making the human capital investment. 4 The utility of an agent c consuming the bundle (x 1 , x 2 ) is thus u (x 1 , x 2 ) − c if the agent invests and u (x 1 , x 2 ) otherwise, where u is a homothetic and strictly quasi-concave function representing the (common) preferences over the two goods.
In the remainder of the paper we call workers who invested in human capital qualified workers, and workers who did not unqualified.
Production Technology
The two consumption goods are produced solely from qualified and unqualified labor, denoted q and n respectively, in accordance with production functions y 1 (·) and y 2 (·) given by,
4 We will often assume that c < 0. The rationale is that if an arbitrarily small fraction of workers like to make the investment even if there are no monetary gains, this eliminates "nuisance equilibria" with zero investments.
All workers are thus perfect substitutes in industry 2, whereas only qualified workers contribute to the production of good 1. 5
Information Technology
A crucial assumption is that human capital investments are observed with noise. This part of the model is set up to make the firms' signal extraction problem as simple as possible. After the investments, nature assigns each worker a signal θ ∈ {g, b}. For simplicity we assume that
The only reason for the restriction that η > 1/2 is that it orders the signals so as to make g "good news" and b "bad news".
What Are Good Empirical Analogues of the Signals?
There is a large empirical literature that seeks to relate human capital with growth and development.
Usually, years of schooling is taken as the (or one) measure of human capital. From the point of view of the firms' problem, it also seems quite reasonable to consider schooling as an imperfect measure of worker productivity. That is, anything that is correlated with productivity is useful for the signal extraction problem, and schooling is presumably one indicator of productivity. The problem with thinking of the signals in our model as formal education is that workers directly choose how many years of schooling to invest in. In our model the actual choice is unobservable. 6 Our preferred interpretation of the setup is as a model where all workers have the same level of formal schooling. The human capital investment can then be thought of as costly effort while in 5 This extreme technology is for simplicity only. Qualitatively, we need two sectors with different factor intensities, just like in the Hecksher-Ohlin model with fixed factor endowments. 6 That is, when signals are chosen we would get a signaling model, with a labor market similar to Spence [24] . Our model is a signal extraction model. We believe that several qualitative insights from our model could be generated also from a signaling model. One consideration that led us to stick with the current formulation is that the signaling setup generates a huge multiplicity of equilibria, where off-the equilibrium path beliefs can be set arbitrarily. In general, we also have multiple equilibria, but, unlike the signalling model, everything is on the equilibrium path. This means that there is a unique equilibrium wage scheme associated with any fixed behavior by the workers. The source of multiplicity is therefore strategic complementarities rather than choice of off-the-equilibrium path beliefs.
school, and the most natural interpretation of the signal is as an aggregate of grades from school, scores on performance tests, letters of recommendation, etc. Firms do make use of various performance tests and spend resources on job interviews. In our view, the only reasonable interpretation of this is that there is an unobservable component of productivity that firms cannot discern by looking at variables such as education and experience.
Obviously, worker productivity is also influenced by years of formal schooling. However, for those workers with the same level of formal schooling we believe that the signal extraction problem in our model, while stylized, is a quite realistic description. The same informational issues would remain also in a richer model with an actual choice also on the length of schooling.
Equilibrium Characterization
Our notion of equilibrium is analogous with a competitive equilibrium in a perfect information environment, but the informational asymmetry makes the treatment of the "labor supply" somewhat non-standard. For clarity, Section 3.1 therefore provides a detailed definition of equilibrium. We then show in Proposition 1 that, for fixed investments, versions of the welfare theorems hold: the equilibrium is characterized by a planning problem (where the informational asymmetry is built into the feasible set). This allows us to appeal to simple graphs in the analysis that follows.
Conditions for Equilibrium
Consider first a agent with realized wage w deciding on how to allocate her earnings between the two goods given prices p = (p 1 , p 2 ). Define the (ex post) maximized utility of the worker as v(w, p) = max
subject to
By strict quasi-concavity of u (x 1 , x 2 ) , the optimization problem in (4) has a unique solution, and, with the usual notational abuse, we denote the demand functions by x 1 (w, p), x 2 (w, p).
Firms cannot observe if a worker is qualified or not, so a labor demand is a map l : {g, b} → R + .
Associated with any fraction of qualified workers, π, and a given labor demand l, the corresponding quantities of qualified and unqualified workers are
where µ (θ, π) denotes the posterior probability that a worker is qualified given prior π, that is
To get tractable market clearing conditions we assume that a strong law of large numbers applies and treat q and n in (5) both as expected and realized inputs of labor.
Without loss of generality there is a representative firm in each sector and each country, which takes the wage schedule w j : {g, b} → R + and output price p i as given. 7 Using the production function (1) and (5), the profit maximization problem for a sector 1 firm may be written as
where µ θ, π j is the posterior probability of being qualified defined in (6) . For sector 2, where qualified and unqualified workers are equally productive, the profit maximization problem is
Agents have rational expectations about the wages and prices, but face uncertainty about the realization of the signal. The expected utility for an agent with investment cost c is
(
If (9) exceeds (10), the worker is better off investing. Investing in human capital is thus optimal for all workers with c
, and the implied fraction of investors is 8
To sum up: optimal consumption plans are defined in (4), the problems (7) and (8) describe the profit maximization problems for each sector, and (11) summarizes the individually optimal human capital investments. What remains to describe are the market clearing conditions.
Factor market clearing simply requires that the aggregate demand for workers with each signal equals the mass of agents who draw the signal. That is, let l
) be a labor demand scheme in industry j and country i and write the labor market clearing conditions as
Finally, for the product market equilibrium conditions it is convenient to let x j i be the output in industry j and country i. That is
which allows us to write the product market clearing conditions for the world market as
#agents with wage w j g
#agents with wage w j b
Our definition of equilibrium is then: 8 If a fraction π j become qualified, the workers that invest must be those with cost c ≤ G −1 π j . To reduce notation we therefore omit the trivial individual investment rules from the definition of equilibrium.
Figure 1: Per Capita Production Possibilities in a Country
(1) l j * 1 solves (7) (4) π j * satisfies (11) given p = p * and wages w j = w j * for j = h, f
The Production Possibilities Set
A useful way to represent the technology is to construct the production possibilities set. The set of feasible output plans in a country depends on π and we let X (π) denote the (per capita) production possibilities set in a country. The set X (π) is depicted graphically in Figure 1 . To understand the figure, first observe that (x 1 , x 2 ) = (0, 1) if all workers are producing good 2, and that (x 1 , x 2 ) = (π, 0) if all workers are producing good 1, since a fraction π of the workers are productive in sector 1. Moreover, if all signal g workers are in sector 1 (πη of these πη+(1 − π) (1−η) workers are productive) and all signal b workers (a total of π (1 − η) + (1 − π) η such workers) are in sector 2, then the outputs are given by the point at the kink in the graph.
The world production possibilities set is given by
means that autarky is equivalent to the restriction that π h = π f .
A Planning Characterization of Continuation Equilibria
We refer to a situation where all equilibrium conditions except (4), the condition that investments are chosen optimally, are fulfilled, as a continuation equilibrium. 9 From a first best point of view, a continuation equilibrium is inefficient: qualified and unqualified workers with the same signal are treated symmetrically, resulting in a misallocation of workers to jobs. However, if the symmetric treatment of workers with the same signal is viewed as a fundamental property of the environment, then the equilibrium allocation is (constrained) efficient conditional on the investment behavior.
This allows us to describe aggregate equilibrium allocations as solutions to the planning problem,
where
While the normative implications of this are of some interest, the main value of this result is that it allows us to appeal to intuitive graphs in the analysis that follws: 10 The proof is in the appendix. Proposition 1 immediately implies: 
A Parametric Specification
In the remainder of the paper we will restrict attention to the case where
unless otherwise stated. We will also for the most part assume that the distribution of investment costs, G, is uniform.
After deriving an expression for the incentives to invest in terms of continuation equilibrium prices, we first consider the autarky benchmark. Proposition 2 establishes some sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the autarky equilibrium. Section 4.5 demonstrates how trade changes incentives, and shows that a unique autarky equilibrium (which is stable in autarky) may be unstable if the economies are open. In Section 4.5.1, we construct an example where countries specialize, and where only the rich country is better off than in autarky. The point with the next example, in Section 4.5.2, is that both countries may gain relative autarky, despite one country being richer than the other "for no good reason". Section 4.6 explains how equilibria of may be reinterpreted as equilibria in an extension with n countries. Finally, Section 5.2 explains why the effects highlighted in this paper would be strengthened by the introduction of mobile capital.
Incentives to Invest
Given the Cobb-Douglas preferences in (16) the relevant individual demand functions are
implying that the maximized continuation utility for a worker that earns wage w is
We set p 2 = 1 and, with some abuse of notation, denote by p π h , π f , w 
Figure 2: Three "Types" of Continuation Equilibria subtracting from this the expectation of v(w, p) conditional on not investing we get the gross benefits of investment for an agent in country j, denoted B j π h , π f , which is given by
Using condition 4 in Definition 1 we see that any
gives an equilibrium fraction of investors in each country. All that remains to calculate full equilibria is to derive expressions for the continuation equilibrium prices.
Continuation Equilibria in Autarky
As a benchmark, we first consider a closed economy. Suppressing the country index, we write π for the proportion of qualified workers. By consulting Figure 2 we conclude that the there are three possible "types" of continuation equilibria; 11
Type A equilibria (allocation of workers "according to signals") Diagrammatically, this is when the tangency is at the kink of the feasible set. That is, all workers with signal b (g) are working in the low (high) tech sector. Outputs are then x 1 = ηπ and 11 Calculations are straightforward, but tedious. See Moro and Norman [19] . 
Candidate equilibrium wages are obtained by observing that zero profits is necessary for profit maximization. Since p 2 = 1, this immediately gives w b (π) = 1. The high tech firm sells ηπ units at price p (π) and hires ηπ + (1 − η) (1 − π) workers with signal g. Zero profits Sector 1 therefore implies that
which has the interpretation that the wage equals the expected value of output. Finally, we have to check that a high tech firm has no incentive to hire a worker with signal b, and that a low tech firm has no incentive to hire a worker with signal g. These conditions give rise to inequalities that determine the region where a Type A continuation equilibrium exists (shown in Figure 3 ).
Type B equilibria (mixing of good signals) In terms of Figure 2 , this corresponds to a tangency to the left of the kink. Workers with signal g earn the same wage in each sector, and, since all workers in the low tech sector are paid 1, it follows immediately that w g (π) = w b (π) = 1.
All that remains is therefore to determine the region where this is an equilibrium. To do this, one first observes that, for the high tech firm to make a zero profit, it must be that p (π) = 1/µ (g, π) .
The price of the high tech good in units of the low tech good is thus determined on the "supply side" in this case. The tangency condition from the planning problem therefore determines the outputs that consumers are willing to purchase at these prices, so this type of equilibrium requires 
x 2 produced by g-workers Figure 3 shows the relevant region.
Type C equilibria (mixing of bad signals) This occurs if and only if α > η, that is when
the demand for the high tech good is very strong. Since no example that follow has an autarky equilibrium of this form we refer the reader to Moro and Norman [19] for details.
Equilibrium investments in Autarky
A closed form expression for the incentives to invest as a function of π is obtained by substituting the wages and prices derived in Section 4.2 into (19) . If α ≤ η, this function may be written as,
where 
Uniqueness of Autarky Equilibria
A useful feature of this parametrization is that there are simple sufficient conditions for when the autarky equilibrium is unique. While not being of much interest in itself, this result facilitates comparisons between trade and autarky. 12
Proposition 2 If G(·) is concave and c < 0, then there is a unique autarky equilibrium.
The interpretation of the condition c < 0 is that the investment in itself provides utility to some (arbitrarily small proportion of) workers. This condition arises because the proof exploits that G (B (π)) cannot intersect the 45 degree line from below.
Equilibria in the Trade Regime
We now assume that h and f trade on a frictionless world market. The number of potential forms of continuation equilibria now swells to 9: in each country the allocation of workers may be like in any of the three types of autarky equilibria (however, mixing in both countries is a knife-edge possibility). To reduce the number of cases we therefore set η = 2/3, α = 1/2, and λ
in the analysis that follows. With these parameter values the continuation equilibrium can be of three different forms. If countries are labeled so that π h ≤ π f the possibilities are:
Exists when with Type B equilibria in autarky, the equilibrium price is then determined from an indifference condition in the allocation of workers with signal g in country h
Type C T Equilibria (mixing of bad signals in f , all in low skill sector in h) This is just like a Type C equilibria in autarky, with some exogenous extra output of the low skilled good.
The equilibrium characterization for the relevant continuation equilibria is summarized in Table   1 . It is understood that π h ≤ π f , so Table 1 does provide a unique continuation equilibrium for any possible π h , π f = (0, 0) by reversing the roles of the countries when necessary. Figure 6 shows the different regions of investment behavior that is relevant for each type of equilibrium.
The most illuminating way to use the continuation equilibria in Table 1 and (19) the benefit to invest for a worker in country f as
where µ (g, π) = 2π/(1 + π) and
Figure 7: Incentives to invest in country f at different values of π h
Expression (24) shows that incentives are strictly increasing in the price of the high tech good.
Moreover, as is easy to check from (25), the equilibrium price is strictly decreasing in π h in the range where some workers in h are in the high tech sector. Hence, a decrease in investments at home improves incentives abroad and an increase in investments in the foreign country reduces incentives at home. In reduced form, this is like a negative cross-country externality in human capital acquisition (see Figure 7 which shows how incentives in f are affected by π h ). These effects create equilibria where countries specialize as rich countries exporting the high-tech good and poor countries exporting the low tech good, also when the autarky equilibrium is unique.
An Asymmetric Equilibrium May Be the Only Stable Outcome A symmetric equilibrium, replicating autarky, always exists in the trade regime. However, for many parameterization, this equilibrium is destabilized when the economy is opened up for international trade. 13 Assume that c < 0, so that there is a unique autarky equilibrium, which we denote by π A . It is then immediate that π A must be stable since G(B(π)) must intersect the 45 o line from above. It also follows that (π h , π f ) = π A , π A is an equilibrium when the countries are allowed to trade.
We want to analyze the effects of small deviations from the symmetric equilibrium. Consider the change in relative price first. When π h = π f = π the price of the high tech good is p (π, π) =
(relevant with trade).
Evaluating each expression at (π A , π A ) we have that
An increase in investments thus have a larger negative impact on the price in autarky, as intuition would suggest. Autarky is equivalent to the trade regime with the added restriction that π h = 13 Since the model lacks real time, "stability" is a somewhat ad hoc criterion that corresponds to the seemingly myopic adjustment dynamic where π
or the natural continuous analogue). Embedding the model in an OLG framework one obtains a dynamic system like this if one assumes that employers
can not differentiate between workers of different cohorts. Figure 8 : Best responses under trade and autarky, at the autarky equilibrium
We can thus use (24) for a comparison of the regimes. In the autarky case, we restrict the two arguments of B f to be equal, while the second argument is unrestricted in the open economy case. Differentiating, we obtain
where p A is shorthand notation for p(π A , π A ). In each case, the effect on incentives is decomposed as a positive "information effect" and a negative "price effect". The information effect in (28) Numerical Illustration The simplest asymmetric equilibrium is when the poor country, which we label as country h, is fully specialized in the low-tech sector. In such an equilibrium, the wage gap in h is zero, so the fraction of qualified workers in h is pinned down as π h = G (0) . Moreover, since the equilibrium under consideration must be either of type B T or C T , the calculation of the incentives in f is straightforward, and the proportion of qualified workers in f solves a single variable fixed point equation similar to the autarky case, but with some "exogenous" extra production of x 2 .
Once π f is obtained from this condition it only remains to check that firms in h have no incentives to hire workers signal g to produce the high tech good.
In Figure 9 we illustrate how shifts in the cost distribution affect the possibility for asymmetric equilibria. The calculations assume that G is uniform over [c, c] Notice that the total world output of both goods is higher in the asymmetric equilibrium (see the 15 Although some agents change their investment behavior in the comparison across equilibria, this does not complicate Pareto comparisons. The crucial fact is that (in the example) both qualified and unqualified workers gain (loose) in country f (h). All workers in the rich country have the option to invest as in the autarky equilibrium, so revealed preference implies that all workers gain. Similarily, in the poor country all workers have the option to invest as in the trade equilibrium when in autarky, so again, by revealed preference, all workers are better off in autarky.
Gross incentives to invest
second row of the table). While prohibitive trade barriers would make country h better off (ignoring that it might take a generation to change the distribution of skills), it is also true that a transfer from f to h is sufficient to make both countries better off relative to the autarky equilibrium. That is, despite the countries being identical, there are some productive gains from specialization.
Example 2: Specialization May Make Both Countries Better Off
We now consider an example where trade makes both countries better off. For maximal simplicity we rig this example so that the "free rider problem" in human capital investments is so severe the unique equilibrium under autarky is the trivial equilibrium. However, with trade, the existence of the other country means that, for any investment π f in country f, the price of good 1 is higher than without trade under the assumption that there are no investments in the other country. Hence, trade allows a new market to emerge that would not operate without trade.
In Table 3 we summarize one such example where the market for good 1 can only operate with international trade. Here, there are actually multiple trade equilibria and the numbers in the table is for the equilibrium with the largest fraction of investors in the country producing good 1. 16 Consumers are happier when consuming both goods than when consuming only one good. Hence since a new market opens up trade is beneficial for both countries.
Pareto Improving Inequality The example above is extreme, but illustrates a more general point: specialization through trade may be viewed as an imperfect "solution" to the informational problem in the model 17 . In the example, there is no way for a market to open unless the rewards for getting into the market are large enough. These rewards are bigger if only one country enters the market: the same "kick" from the local informational externality is generated at a smaller negative price effect. Specialization thus reduces the problem of underinvestment in human capital.
Even in less extreme cases, both countries may gain from specializing. As is illustrated in Figure   10 it is always true that the production possibilities set expand when moving from a situation where both countries invest at the same rate to an asymmetric investment profile for a constant total quantity of investors in the world. In the figure, the frontier to the left with the kink at point A is 16 There is also an equilibrium with π h = 0, π f = 0.0157. However, unlike the equilibrium in Table 3 this is unstable. 17 For a detailed elaboration on this point in the context of discrimination, see Norman [20] . Table 3 : Trade and autarky equilibria in Example 2 some symmetric investment profile, whereas the frontiers with kinks at B and C corresponds with an asymmetric investment profile. Assuming that countries are of equal size, the total number of investors in the world is unchanged, but the world production possibilities set is nevertheless larger (the frontier with kinks at D, A and E in the graph to the right). To understand this, note that the efficient way of increasing x 1 starting from the vertical intercept is to first only use workers from the country with investments π + k with good signals, so initially the slope of the world production possibilities set must be the same as the set to the left with kink at C. The graph is drawn for the case where it is better to use high signal workers from the low investment country than low signal workers from the high investment country in sector 1, but the result is fully general.
Gross incentives to invest
B h (π h , π f ) = 0 B f (π h , π f ) =
The Irrelevance of Size of a Country
Since this is a general equilibrium model with large countries, changes of the relative size of the countries will in general affect the asymmetric equilibria due to price effects. The nature of such However, these scale effects are not really "country-scale-effects". Instead, we prefer to think of them as scale effects that have to do with the relative size of the North to the South. To understand this, suppose that there are n countries indexed by j ∈ {1, ..., n} . Let λ j denote the size of country j and consider an equilibrium in this model where the set of countries is partitioned into the sets P and R and where π j = π p for all j ∈ P and π j = π r for all j ∈ R. Finally let λ p = j∈P λ j and λ r = j∈R λ j . This is an equilibrium if and only if (π p , π r ) is an equilibrium in the two-country model with countries of sizes (λ p , λ r ). There may of course be other equilibria as well, but at least for this form of equilibrium the size of the individual country is irrelevant and the relevant scale effect can be interpreted in our preferred manner.
A "development miracle" can therefore be interpreted as a country which manages to recoordinate from being part of the developing world to being part of the developed world. The model cannot explain how such a re-coordination is achieved, but, if the economy is small, the effects on the rest of the world are negligible. In contrast, a simultaneous recoordination of a significant fraction of the "South" may lead to large enough relative price changes so that it is not worth the while as long as there is no change in the "North". Obviously, the model is too stylized for direct policy recomendations, but this nevertheless suggests that it may be misguided to use a few small successful countries as a model for all developing countries.
Discussion

The Skill Premium
As discussed in Section 2.4, we have some reservations about identifying the signals as the level of formal education. Nevertheless, we will for now ignore this issue and identify w b rather than the ratio (see (19) ). 18 Given that the rich country (f ) is fully specialized in the "high tech" sector, which allows w f b to exceed w h b , the model is consistent with the conventional skill premium for poor countries to be larger than the one in rich countries. Table 4 displays such an example where the skill premium in the poor country measured as a ratio exceeds that of the rich country. For simplicity, the example is constructed by assuming that the rich country is small, which assures that the poor country will be near the autarky allocation.
This allows us to set π f to an arbitrary value (high enough to assure full specialization), which we rationalize in equilibrium by an appropriate choice of a uniform distribution. 19 Relying on full specialization may seem extreme, but the restriction to two sectors is made for tractability rather than realism. The basic economics of the model should be present also in a model with more than two sectors, and with n sectors it seems rather plausible that some sectors are shut down in some countries. 18 Indeed, the wage differential tends to be larger in richer countries, which is neither surprising, nor support for our model. Our argument in this section is only that our model has nothing to say about the skill premium as conventionally measured. 19 The distribution must also rationalize the particular autarky equilibrium in the poor country as well. However, the benefit to invest in the poor country (0.0378) and the benefit to invest in the rich country (0.0384) give us two points of the cumulative: G (0.0378) = π h = 1/12 and G (0.0384) = π f = 5/6, so this is pure back-calculation. To sum up, the existing empirical literature measures the skill premium as a ratio for a good reason: the neoclassical growth model has implications about ratios and is silent about differences.
Our model, on the other hand, has implications about differences and is silent on ratios. This is not a technical detail, but comes directly from the economics of the model. An individual compares her expected utility from investing with the expected utility if not investing, which means that the difference rather than the ratio of expected utilities is what is relevant. 20 Notice that this does not mean that are model is empirically vacuous. Checking whether incentives to acquire skills line up as they should in accordance with the theory is something that can be implemented with the right data. Moreover, the model has other implications. For example, a robust implication is that, in a rich country, the wage of workers in the export sector should exceed the wage of workers in the sector where the country is a net importer. The opposite relation should hold in a poor country. 21 20 It may be argued that this is also driven by the fact that the cost is an additively separable utility cost rather than a time cost. This is correct under the assumption that firms cannot condition wages on age. In the seemingly more plausible case where age can be used for inference, differences again matter. We also note that the date for graduation usually is to a large extent predetermined, and that if the time cost is foregone time for working extra at a given wage (w j b for example), then we are back in the additively separable case. 21 Firm level data is difficult to obtain for many developing countries, but using industry data from the World Bank Trade and Production database one can compute export and domestic by weighting industry wages by the shares of value of exports. This calculation led to numbers consistent with our model. See Moro and Norman [19] .
Complementarities Between Capital and Human Capital
A natural extension is to introduce (regular) capital into the production technology. We believe that this would be interesting for analyzing the role of foreign capital and capital flight from poor countries. Moreover, it could also be helpful for quantitative purposes. The main reason that we do not introduce capital in this paper is that it adds little to the economics of the model.
To understand this, suppose initially that capital cannot flow between countries. While there is now an additional dimension to the problem in that capital must be allocated across sectors, qualitative results from the model without capital continue to hold. Now, consider an equilibrium where one country specializes in the high-tech industry and the other in the low-tech industry.
Assuming equal initial endowments of capital, the return on capital in the high tech country is higher than in the other country, so capital would flow from the poor to the rich country. This in turn would increase (decrease) the marginal product of labor in the high tech sector in the rich (poor) country, thereby improving (reducing) incentives to invest in the rich (poor) country. Mobile capital would thus only strengthen the incentives to specialize. 22 
Relationship with the Existing Literature
Increasing Returns and Agglomeration Models While our underlying assumptions are very different, the model shares many features with trade models with increasing returns (Eithier [7] , and Krugman [12] ). In particular, versions that are usually referred to as "agglomeration models" (Krugman and Venables [13] , Matsuyama [16] , Puga and Venables [21] ) are similar along several dimensions. These models, as is ours, are capable of generating a core-periphery pattern in equilibrium between fundamentally identical countries.
Agglomeration models can sustain a concentration of (high income) manufacturing because production costs decrease in the size of the manufacturing industry. Manufactured goods are inputs in the production of manufactures, implying that being close to other producers of manufactured goods saves on transportation costs. This creates incentives to concentrate production. If transportation costs are neither too small or too large, there are equilibria where manufacturing is concentrated in one country. As a consequence, this country becomes richer than the other country. 22 Details are available on request from the authors.
While our model is considerably less complicated and closer to the neoclassical benchmark, there is a close similarity in how a pecuniary externality interacts with local market conditions. However, there are also crucial differences. Agglomeration models predict a positive relation between size and development: the larger is the home market, the more room there is for a wide array of manufactures. Our model has no such implications (see Section 4.6). 23 Moreover, the division into rich and a poor countries may in our model Pareto dominate autarky. We are not aware of any increasing returns model with this feature.
Alternative Mechanisms for Human Capital Externalities Our paper is related in spirit with Acemoglu [1] , who provides an alternative microfoundation for human capital externalities.
The mechanism considered by Acemoglu is the interaction between non-contractible investments in human and physical capital and costly search, which generates a pecuniary externality since optimal investment strategies depend on aggregate investments on the other side of the market. For example, Razin and Sadka [22] use an informational asymmetry to model the role of foreign direct investments, Casella and Rauch [3] derives a role for minority groups in international trade from an informational friction, and McCalman [17] considers the impact of asymmetric information in bargaining about trade agreements.
More closely related to this paper are Grossman and Maggi [9] and Grossman [8] , who consider an essentially competitive environment with imperfect observability of talent. However, for their purposes it is sufficient to consider how trade is affected by exogenous differences in the distribution of talent, so they completely ignore the incentive issues for acquiring skills that are central in our model. To our knowledge, the only paper that considers asymmetric information about skills in an environment where individual workers actually invest in their skills is Eicher [6] . He consider a model that is significantly richer than ours in many ways, but the treatment of the informational asymmetry is more reduced form than the model considered here. 23 There is disagreement about the facts. Our view is that the lack of country scale effects is a virtue, but Alesina et al [2] argues that scale effects can be detected in the data.
Summary and Concluding Remarks
We have shown that it is possible to generate endogenous comparative advantages between identical countries in an essentially neoclassical model. The model generates specialization and income differentials due to an informational externality that arises because workers are better informed than firms about abilities to perform different jobs. This microfoundation necessarily implies that the scope of the externality is local, where the local market is defined by barriers to labor mobility.
An important difference from the existing literature is that, while the two country modeled studied is not completely scale neutral, there are no scale effects that are driven by the size of the home market. The two country model can be reinterpreted as equilibria of a n country model where Figure 11 (B) was computed with the 25 The slope condition for the autarky equilibrium is satisfied under the conditions of Proposition 2. Its role is that if the equilibrium was at a tangency with the 45 0 line, the slightest effect from abroad could eliminate the equilibrium.
